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POWER IN THE SOCIAL/POLITICAL REALM
JAYNE SEMINARE DOCHERTY*

"Power is nothing more (or less) than the capacity to get work done
against time."'
Any metaphor has limitations as well as strengths. The above metaphor of
power, taken from physics, is useful for highlighting some features of power
in a social encounter such as negotiation. 2 But taken too far, the metaphor can
obscure important features of social reality. In the social realm, unlike the
world of physics, the definition of work is debatable, time is malleable, and
the mere capacity to use power can influence outcomes in a social encounter.
Getting a car to run faster or more efficiently is a clear measure of
work accomplished. But who defines the measurement of success in any
given social encounter? Parties may enter a negotiation with very different
goals and objectives and, therefore, different ideas about what constitutes
work accomplished.
For example, a husband in a divorce negotiation wants to protect his
retirement benefits from his wife's claims. His wife wants compensation for
all the years she stayed at home raising their children and for all she did to
help him in his career advancement. Both of them could pull out all the stops,
hire powerful attorneys, and fight this out to the bitter end. In other words,
they could each try to use "coercive social power" to achieve their goals.
The concept of coercive social power derives from two common
metaphors: "life is a game" and "power is the ability to win the game." From
this perspective, the person or group with the most power gets to have their
way on issues of importance. They are able to protect their interests, assure
their own well-being, and shape the world around them to their own benefit.
Thus, they "win" the competitive game of life.
However, not all relationships are competitive, even if they are conflicted.
We do not treat everyone in our lives as rivals in a game. Social relationships,
cultural norms, a sense of fairness, and feelings of guilt may mitigate
* Associate Professor of Conflict Studies, Conflict Transformation Program, Eastern
Mennonite
University. Ph.D. George Mason University; A.B. Brown University.
1. http://www.physics.ucla.edu/k-6connection/forwpsa.htm (last visited January 11, 2004).
2. This definition of power is rooted in a Newtonian paradigm; it does not include all of the
complexity introduced by Einstein and others into the world of physics. The conflict resolution
world has been slow to embrace metaphors from the "new physics" and many practitioners bring
attitudes and practices that still look at power related concepts, such as time, in more fixed,

Newtonian ways.
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someone's willingness to use coercive social power. Even identity issues
influence the way we use power. The identity frames of negotiators, which
"describe how parties view themselves, both as individuals and as members of
a group,"3 may lead someone to avoid using coercive power even when she
can do so. In this case, she may shun the stereotypical image of vindictive
first wife, and he may need to see himself as magnanimous and generous to
his first wife in order to avoid being stereotyped as someone trading in a
faithful life partner for a trophy wife.
So, our hypothetical couple chooses negotiation rather than litigation, and
their different definitions of the work to be accomplished in their negotiation
actually provide the basis for integrative rather than distributive bargaining.
She drops her claims to his retirement benefits in return for a one-time cash
settlement to finance her education and career development. So, was the work
accomplished? Neither got exactly what he or she wanted, but they are both
relatively satisfied.
Why did they choose this settlement rather than opting to use raw power
to coerce the other party? To understand this decision, we need to ask how
each of them understood time. In Newtonian physics, we measure time on a
fixed linear scale. But social time is not just a matter of elapsed minutes or
days or years. Social time is the trajectory of a human life; it has value for
what we can do in it or what we cannot do in it. Social time has meaning and
its value is shaped as much by the quality of the life we live during that time
as by the quantity of time we have. In the divorce case, time was a key factor
in each party's decision to go for the win-win agreement. He wanted the
divorce to be done quickly, because he wanted to marry his girlfriend. She
was concerned that time spent getting what she was legally entitled to would
be time taken from her opportunity to get an education and restart her career.
How did this couple calculate the value of social time? A Newtonian
physics perspective would lead us to think about how this couple traded time.
We might even talk about time as something these parties were able to give or
to withhold from each other. We might argue that she could have "stolen" his
time for a new marriage by hiring a powerful lawyer and fighting for her
rights. Or, we might say, he was able to "give" her time for her education
with an immediate, large, cash settlement. This perspective might lead to
questions such as: Did he pay her not to steal his time for a new marriage?
Or, did she accept a bribe not to press her rightful claim?
Who had and who used power in this case? We cannot answer this
question unless we recognize that even the capacity and the willingness to use
3. Marcia Caton Campbell & Jayne Seminare Docherty, What's in a Frame? (That Which We
Call a Rose by Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet), 87 MARQ. L. REv. 769, 774 (2004).
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power is a form of power in the social world. Unlike the physical world, the
mere ability to use power in the social world can influence the actions of the
other party in a negotiation. Or, as Russell Korobkin notes below, perceptions
matter and the parties in this case did not make a coldly rational decision
about which of them had the better "best alternative to a negotiated
agreement" (BATNA). To determine the relative merits of fighting or
settling, each party had to speculate on the other's ability and willingness to
use coercive social power to achieve a desired outcome. He knew she
probably had a good legal case, and he believed she would dig in her heels
and keep fighting if he did not give her some monetary settlement. She knew
that he had deep pockets and could outspend her on attorneys if she persisted
in her claims to his retirement. A long, drawn-out court battle would cost her
time and opportunity for her education.
On the other hand, maybe they did not actually make their decisions based
on a rational calculation of who would win an all out fight and who was
willing to engage in such a battle. This may be a case where a Newtonian
physics metaphor actually keeps us from understanding the motivations of the
parties. The entire preceding analysis of motives and reasons for settling is
implicitly rooted in the idea of competition as the norm. Perhaps, in this case
the parties actually decided to use "collaborative power" to increase the
likelihood of mutually desired ends.4 The concept of collaborative power
rests in yet another metaphor of power, the notion of power as a "creative
force." From this perspective, it is possible to conceive of power with, rather
than power over, others, even others with whom one is in conflict. The very
concepts of creating new options, expanding the pie, and crafting a win-win
option for resolving a conflict rest in the reality of creative power. Parties can
work together to build options that were not obvious before, but they must
first stop thinking about power as only a force to be wielded against those
who would block their desired outcome.
Do we know for sure which forms of power our hypothetical divorcing
couple used or pondered using? Not unless we ask them. Even then, they
might not be able to tell us exactly what metaphor of power governed their
decision making. The truth is, they probably both considered using coercive
power, but their decision not to take that road was probably not based solely
on a rational analysis of their potential to win the game. Emotions, habits of
cooperation, guilt, a desire not to look vengeful or vindictive, and a sense that
collaborative power is more dignified and less destructive may all have played
into their decision as well.
This is why it is very important for negotiators to understand that power
4. MEDIATION AND FACILITATION TRAINING MANUAL 78 (Carolyn Schrock Shenk ed. 2000).

2004]

POWER

comes in many forms, and the motivation to use different forms of power in
any given situation is a complex process of meaning making, not just a
rational choice. Furthermore, even coercive power comes in different forms,
and it is important to distinguish among them.
John Gaventa talks about three different forms of coercive social power.
In its most raw form-let's call it "direct power"-coercive social power
occurs when party A exercises power over party B to get B to do something
that B would not otherwise do. 6 This understanding of power focuses on
behavior and it assumes that the real questions to ask when looking at a
process such as negotiation are who participates in a process, who gains and
loses, and who wins the day.7
A second dimension of coercive social power might be called "process
power." Rather than coercing another person to do something he or she
would not otherwise do, process power shapes the playing field, or in this case
a negotiation process. Process power is most easily thought of as a party's
ability to control the agenda in a negotiation and the power to include or
exclude parties from a negotiation. In legal settings, this power is manifested
in arguments for and against giving a party standing in a case. There, the
judge is deemed the neutral arbiter of fairness. But when attorneys negotiate
on behalf of their clients without benefit of a judge's oversight, issues of
process power reside with the parties and the attorneys.
An even more insidious form of social power occurs when party A is able
to get party B to do what he does not want to do and exercise power over him
by influencing or shaping his very wants.8 When examining this form of
social power, we need to look at "the means through which power influences,
shapes, or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities, and
strategies of challenge in situations of latent conflict." 9 Notice that this form
of social power may make negotiations highly unlikely since the party with a
grievance may not even see that he has a grievance to be negotiated.
To this list of coercive power, we might want to add the power of the
spoiler. Negotiators sometimes forget to look at the larger system within
which they are working, and they fail to identify what we might call
secondaryparties to a conflict. The stakeholders in a social conflict may not
completely coincide with the parties at the negotiation table. Negotiators

5. JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS (1982).

6. Id. at 5.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 12; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
9. GAVENTA, supra note 5, at 15.
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should always ask whether there are other stakeholders in the conflict who are
likely to be affected by the outcome of a negotiation even if they are not
directly involved at this time. These stakeholders may use their power to
spoil an agreement if they are not included in the negotiation or consulted
about the proposed settlement.
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BARGAINING POWER AS THREAT OF
IMPASSE
RUSSELL KOROBKIN**

In an ideal world, all negotiators would have what are sometimes called
"common interests."1 The old chandelier that to me is clutter in the basement
would be an antique to you, and your pleasure in receiving it would be
outweighed only by my joy in getting rid of it. In most bargaining situations,
however, negotiators' interests are in conflict. You might like the chandelier
more than I do, which makes a mutually advantageous bargain possible, but it
is currently lighting my dining room and I would prefer to keep it rather than
give it away. You are interested in buying the chandelier from me, but you
want to pay a low price. I will consider selling it to you, but I want a high
price. Who will succeed in achieving his goal will most likely depend on who
has more bargaining power, defined as the ability to convince the other
negotiator to give us what we want even when the other would prefer not to
do so.
The source of bargaining power is misunderstood by many negotiators,
who wrongly assume that the indicia of success in other realms of life are
directly related to power at the negotiating table. Wealth, brains, beauty,
political power, prestige, and social influence are nice to have, but none of
these items guarantee you the ability to exercise power in any particular
negotiation. Bargaining power is situational, not personal. In some labor
disputes, unions have more power than management; in others, management
has more power than unions. In some merger negotiations, the target
company enjoys more power than the suitor; in others, the dynamic is
reversed. In some litigation settlement negotiations, the plaintiff has more
power than the defendant; in others, the defendant enjoys the advantage. An
employee seeking a raise from his boss might enjoy a relative power
advantage, or he might not.
In each of these situations, relative bargaining power stems entirely from
the negotiator's ability to, explicitly or implicitly, make a single threat
credibly: "I will walk away from the negotiating table without agreeing to a
deal ifyou do not give me what I demand." The source of the ability to make
such a threat, and therefore the source of bargaining power, is the ability to
Professor of Law, UCLA.
1. See e.g., DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR (1986).
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project that he has a desirable alternative to reaching an agreement,
often
3
2
referred to as a "BATNA." This essay elaborates on this claim.

I. BATNA STRENGTH

What you will do in the case of impasse determines your relative power in
the negotiation. In market situations with fungible buyers and sellers, your
BATNA is to enter into a similar transaction with someone other than your
negotiating counterpart and, thus, your power depends implicitly on the forces
of supply and demand. Imagine that you arrive at an automobile dealership
hoping to pay "dealer invoice" for the car of your choice and begin to
negotiate with a dealer who hopes to charge the "sticker price." Your
BATNA is to buy the same car from another dealer. The dealer's BATNA is
to wait for the next customer to enter the showroom and attempt to sell the car
to that customer. If the model you have selected is in short supply and all of
the other dealers in town have a waiting list of purchasers, your BATNA is
relatively weak (you will have to wait for a car and probably pay a premium)
and the dealer's BATNA is relatively strong (he is confident that another
customer will be willing to pay the sticker price). The dealer enjoys
substantial power because he can threaten impasse if you do not agree to pay
the sticker price, and that threat would be credible because impasse would be
in his best interest. In contrast, if all dealers are overstocked and the new
year's models are soon to arrive, you will enjoy power. You can credibly
threaten to walk away if the dealer will not agree to a handsome discount
because the chances are good that another dealer anxious to reduce inventory
would likely agree to a discount, meaning that impasse would be in your best
interest if you do not receive the price that you demand.
If the negotiation situation has an element of bilateral monopoly-that is,
comparable transactions are unavailable to the parties-your bargaining
power will depend on the relative quality of the substitute transaction you
would enter into in the case of impasse. In litigation bargaining, a plaintiff
and defendant who fail to reach agreement do not have the option of settling
with different parties. Instead, both have the BATNA of submitting to
adjudication of the dispute.4 Bargaining power depends on whether that
2. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES:NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN 100 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (coining the well-known acronym, short for "Best Alternative
to a Negotiated Agreement").
3. For a more elaborate treatment of this subject, see RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION
THEORY AND STRATEGY 149-82 (2002).

4. In the case of a low value claim, the plaintiffs BATNA might be to dismiss the suit. But
assuming adjudication dominates dismissal for the plaintiff, adjudication will be the plaintiffs
BATNA. Usually, negotiating parties have different BATNAs, but notice that in the litigation
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BATNA is more desirable for the plaintiff or the defendant. If the plaintiffs
case is strong on the legal merits and provable damages are high, the plaintiff
will enjoy bargaining power because she can credibly threaten to end
negotiations and proceed to adjudication if she does not receive the high
settlement price that she demands. The defendant, of course, can make the
same threat if the plaintiff will not accept a low settlement offer, but the threat
would not be credible because it would not be in the defendant's best interest
to take a weak case to court and face the likelihood of a large verdict rather
than agree to pay a higher settlement price.
II. PERCEPTION IS REALITY
Strictly speaking, it is not the actual, objective quality of the negotiator's
BATNA that determines his degree of bargaining power, but what the
counterpart believes that the negotiator believes about the quality of his
5
BATNA.
For example, when an employee receives a job offer from a
competing firm and asks his boss for a raise, whether the employee has power
depends on whether the boss believes that the employee believes it is in the
employee's best interest to accept the competing offer if the demand for a
raise is not met. The credibility of the employee's threat to walk away from
the negotiation and accept the competing offer if his demand is not met is
unaffected by the fact that neither the boss nor any of the employee's
colleagues would prefer the competing offer to the employee's current job at
his current salary. Where power is concerned, the beauty of a BATNA is in
the eye of the beholder, and eccentricity is not penalized as long as it is
perceived to be genuine. 6 The employee's threat of impasse will be credible
to the boss, thus giving the employee power, even if the employee himself
actually would not prefer the competing offer, so long as the boss thinks that
the employee would prefer that offer.
An objectively strong BATNA is helpful, of course, because a BATNA
that appears strong renders the negotiator's claim that he believes his BATNA
is strong more credible. The employee's threat of impasse will more likely
translate into bargaining power if his competing job offer is a $300,000 per

context they have the same BATNA, because a plaintiff who opts for adjudication has the legal right
to force the defendant to submit to adjudication also. Of course, the fact that the two parties have the
same BATNA (submitting to adjudication) does not suggest that this BATNA has the same value to
each of them or that they will have the same reservation price. For a more complete discussion, see
Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1794-97 (2000).
5. Cf David Sally, Social Manuevers and Theory of Mind, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 893 (2004).
6. As Thomas Schelling wrote, the person who stands on a stranger's porch and threatens to kill
himself if the stranger does not give him $10 is more likely to be paid "if his eyes are bloodshot."
THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22 (1960).
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year CEO position than if it is a $15,000 per year mailroom attendant
position. But either a phantom BATNA (i.e., a nonexistent alternative) or a
real BATNA with phantom value (i.e., an existent but undesirable alternative)
can be a source of power in the hands of a persuasive negotiator.

III. PATIENCE AND POWER
In many bargaining contexts, especially those involving bilateral
monopoly, the BATNA of both parties, at least in the short term, will be to
continue to negotiate not to pursue a substitute transaction. In this situation, a
negotiator's threat not to agree unless her demands are met is in essence a
threat of temporary rather than permanent impasse. When both parties have a
BATNA of temporary impasse, the negotiator for whom temporary impasse is
less costly has the strongest BATNA and thus the lion's share of bargaining
power. If you have a low cost of temporary impasse, you have the ability to
be patient in the negotiations. Thus, it follows that patience translates into
bargaining power.
When a union and management meet to attempt to negotiate a settlement
of a strike, union members rarely threaten to find substitute employment, and
management is precluded by law from firing the striking workers.7 The
union's threat is that if management does not meet its demands, it will
continue to strike. Management's threat is that, if the union does not accede
to its terms, it will continue to permit the strike to go on. If the union has a
large strike fund and if management cannot fill its orders with the labor of
replacement workers, the union can be more patient in reaching an agreement
and will enjoy superior bargaining power. In contrast, if the union's strike
fund is empty and its members cannot pay their rents while management has a
large quantity of inventory in storage, temporary impasse will be relatively
more costly to the union, giving management power.
IV. THE RISKS OF POWER
In a world in which opposing negotiators had perfect information about
the other's alternatives and preferences and both made all negotiating
decisions with cold rationality, attempts to exercise bargaining power would
never cause impasse. In any situation in which a mutually beneficial

7. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (2000). Although not
important for the analysis here, the law is actually somewhat more complicated than this statement
suggests. Management may legally hire "permanent" replacement workers and consequently refuse
to give striking workers their jobs back when the strike ends until there are vacancies. See, e.g., Seth
D. Harris, Coase's Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent Strike Replacements, 80 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1185, 1188 (2002).
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agreement were possible, the party with relatively less power would yield to
the party with relatively more. 8
Few negotiations, however, are characterized by perfect information and
lack of emotion. If both negotiators believe that they have a strong BATNA
but that their counterpart does not, each might try to exercise power while
neither yields. Thus, lawsuits go to trial, labor strikes drag on, and ethnic
warfare continues, even when agreements that would make both sides better
off are feasible. Alternatively, or in addition, the less powerful party might
resent the sense of coercion or inequity inherent in the more powerful
negotiator's demands and refuse to yield, even knowing that this course of
action will cause harm to both sides. 9 These twin possibilities make the
exercise of bargaining power as potentially risky as it is potentially rewarding.

8. Game theorists have demonstrated that, under these assumptions, negotiators would divide
the cooperative surplus to be gained from reaching agreement in proportion to their relative costs of
impasse. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 222 (1994).
9. An excellent example is the "ultimatum game," in which Player A proposes a division of a
stake-say $10-and Player B either accepts the proposal, in which case both players receive the
allocation proposed by A, or rejects the proposal, in which case both players receive $0. Although
Player B maximizes his income by accepting any nonzero offer, research repeatedly demonstrates
that experimental subjects in the role of B often reject low (but nonzero) offers, thus making both
players worse off. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairnessand Retaliation: The Economics
of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (2000); Werner Guth & Reinhard Tietz, Ultimatum
BargainingBehavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results, I I J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
417 (1990).
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THE PHYSICS OF POWER
CHRISTOPHER HONEYMAN

t

"Power" is a term much thrown around in discussions of negotiations, but
often without much thought as to what it really consists of. As we have seen
above, there are at least two parallel sets of conceptions operating in social,
political, and legal thinking in our field. The purpose of this essay is to make
a modest proposal of a third.
While there are dangers in mechanistic metaphors, there is also a precision
in the concept of power as used in physics, which has potential value to
negotiators, and may help to clear the air, given that this term is so often used
in "loaded" ways. Let's consider briefly some concepts of power that arise
from physics, but appear interesting in negotiation.
The most immediate of these is the one challenged above by Jayne
Seminare Docherty, that power is nothing more (or less) than the capacity to
get work done against time. In electrical form, this can be summarized as
"volts times amps." In a car engine, doubling the power means that the car
can accelerate to a given speed in half the time (but ignoring friction, which
should never be ignored in negotiation: see below).
Acknowledging the objection that opens Docherty's essay, this conception
still has several useful implications when applied to negotiation. The first is
that power is distinguishable from two phenomena with which it is frequently
confused in practice: influence and celebrity. It is common to hear a person
or group described as powerful, when a moment's reflection by the speaker
would admit the likelihood that the person spoken of cannot in fact effectuate
anything much in any foreseeable length of time without a lot of help from
some other source. The distinction is all-important in understanding what
actually happens in negotiations. But it is routinely forgotten, even though
there is plenty of well-known lore to support it. For example, this is the
essential teaching behind two well-known stories of U.S. Presidents, not only
Teddy Roosevelt's description of the Presidency as "a bully pulpit,"' but also
Harry Truman's response to a visitor who remarked on the array of buttons on
the President's telephone: "I can push every one of those buttons, and nothing
happens." (That, at least, was the gist of his reported response.) It is even
arguable that the routine press description of a U.S. President as "the most
t Christopher Honeyman is director of the Broad Field Project.
1. Respectfully
Quoted:
A
Dictionary
of Quotations
http://www.bartleby.com/73/1508.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).

(1989),

available

at
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powerful person in the world" has routinely created an imagery to match
inside the White House, with the insidious effect of persuading more than one
president that he had power to do something, when he in fact did not.
Another potentially valuable concept from physics is that power is afixed
quantity: The analogy argues that to whatever degree one person really has
power over a given situation, someone else does not. Of course, in the
social/political realm, only autocracies really are organized this way. By
contrast, influence can be very strong, and yet be shared. Thus, in any society
that has political checks and balances, it is likely that when political actors
speak of having power, influence is often what they are really discussing.
A change to the language of influence might be more palatable for powerseekers with a little reflection on three other physical analogies. In one, the
actual use of power, in physics, uses it up, and there's plenty of evidence that
in many negotiating situations (legal, political or social) the analogy has held
up rather well. Unlike power, influence is not necessarily used up when it is
used; the wise use of influence may lead to the holder acquiring more. Then,
there is the physics principle that "every action (read, exercise of power)
creates an equal and opposite reaction." No one has ever said the same about
the exercise of influence, perhaps because the concept of influence carries an
overtone of discussion (and hence, of negotiation) rather than of fiat. And
finally, it is also worth remarking that when power is exercised and causes an
opposite reaction in someone, it must then be exercised against that resistance
(in different aspects of physics, friction, electrical resistance, etc.)-and much
of it will probably be dissipated ineffectually. In physics, and frequently in
negotiations, that usually means "as heat."

CONCLUSION

These essays have one thing in common. in their different ways, each
hints that there is a positive feedback loop to power; i.e., a reputationfor
being powerful is itself a source of power. In Docherty's metaphor, the
reputation of the powerful alone may coerce the powerless, and so the latter
may become "self-coerced"; in Korobkin's, the powerful negotiator is
credited with a good BA TNA without having to demonstrate it; in
Honeyman 's,power may be more effective when it is not directly expended.
This, of course, leaves the powerless with the usual uncomfortable
choices. One response, the "soft answer that turneth away wrath" is a
classicformula in a negotiationfor stayingfocused on what you want, while
keeping an overbearingperson from either dominating the negotiation or
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making negotiation unworkable. Whether the student of negotiation chooses
in such a situation to apply the concept of social power to affect the
intemperate speaker, the "power to walk" in order to calculate whether to
reply softly or go, or the analogies of physics in order to estimate a best
response, she is probably better off with a largertoolbox of ways to assess the
situation. Here, we have merely sought to offer a choice of metaphors for
this, and at least a select range of other negotiatingsituations. We hope the
reader willfind the tools as useful as they are varied.
We would like to thank readerDavid Sally for his insightful comments on
a draft of these essays.
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